VII.—NEW BOOKS.

Truth and Reality: an Introduction to the Theory of Knowledge. By J. E. Boodin. Published by the Macmillan Company. Pp. ix, 334.

The present work is mainly epistemological and is to be taken as in some measure introductory to a metaphysical volume called *A Realistic Universe* which the author proposes to publish shortly.

It begins with a genetic account of the individual mind. The author is here concerned to show that the higher stages of mental life constitute genuine leaps and that they cannot be analysed into mere complications of what was present at a lower stage. Interaction with an appropriate environment is needed to produce them and the lower stages must have been present first, but these are conditions and not the full constituents of the higher stages. It is also insisted that we must assume innate capacities to produce these stages under appropriate stimulation, a view which is supposed (rather rashly, I think, though the author might quote in his favour a famous sentence in Gibbon's *Autobiography*) to be denied by Locke and the English school. Owing to the necessity with which all these stages of mental life are evoked by the right stimulus at the right time the author calls them instinctive. As the thought stage is itself instinctive in origin in this sense the author might be accused by a careless reader of trying to produce reflective thought out of instinct. This would be a mistake arising from the fact that the mental reactions typical of the lower stages of mind follow on their stimuli in the same kind of way as all the stages including that of reflective thought follow as wholes on *their* appropriate stimuli.

The author seems to me to use the word 'category' in an unusual sense. He includes Habit and Imitation together with the usual categories, and he says that there are categories at every stage of mind. But surely there is a difference. Habit, *e.g.* is a quality, a characteristic of mind, at certain levels, but space is not a quality or characteristic of a mind at any level. Thus habit is not a category *of* the habitual level in the sense that space is a category of the perceptual level.

Judgment is next discussed. It is an attempt to adjust ourselves to an unsatisfactory or novel situation by grasping reflectively what it has in common with other situations that have already been satisfactorily dealt with. An effort is made to prove that negative judgment must precede positive ones. The argument is that it is only by finding that the situation does not fulfil expectation that we are led to make positive judgments in order to deal effectively with it. This may be very true, but it does not prove that the dissatisfaction has to be expressed by a negative judgment or by a judgment at all. Surely a present pain would be enough.

Two statements that appear to me to contain logical errors must be noted. Prof. Boodin says that inference is only an expansion of judgment. This is to forget the essential peculiarity of inference, *viz.* the principle that if the antecedent of a true hypothetical can be asserted

the consequent can be asserted alone. The other doubtful statement is that all arguments could be rendered syllogistic by the introduction of suitable major premises. Let the author try his hand on '$A > B$, $B > C$, $\therefore A > C$'.

On page 106, where Prof. Boodin discusses consciousness of relations, I find two sentences in a very odd conjunction. 'Is our consciousness of likeness and difference, of side by side . . . reducible to mere sensations in the head or throat? Is the consciousness of the activity of thought in short reducible to kinæsthetic images and sensations?' Surely these two questions are not the same as the phrase 'in short' seems to suggest. Unless 'side by side' and the other relations be activities of thought consciousness of side by side cannot be the same as consciousness of the activity of thought. To ask whether the latter is reducible to kinæsthetic images and emotions is to ask a reasonable question, but the same cannot be said of the first inquiry.

Prof. Boodin now discusses the Axiom of Internal Relations. He holds that some relations as far as we can see are merely external, but that others are not and that there is no logical reason why all should not be internal. I think his discussion would have been greatly improved if he had stated clearly what is meant by the very ambiguous phrase 'making a difference to their terms' which is freely used in arguments on this subject. He seems to hold that the parts of living bodies are internally related. Whether this be true or not must of course depend on what is meant by internal, but I would suggest that the parts of living bodies are perfectly capable of existing for a time at any rate in other relations, and that the fact that when so related they do not form a *living* whole is not more remarkable than the fact that it is only in certain spatial relations that Oxygen and Hydrogen form an explosive whole.

The postulates of thought are next considered. These according to Prof. Boodin are the laws of Identity and Contradiction, the subject-object relation, the law of totality, and the law of finitude. The law of totality means that everything that can be experienced must be capable of making some difference directly or indirectly to some mind. The law of finitude is that nothing that we experience can need an infinitely complex act of thought. This is true as a matter of empirical fact and it was perhaps of value to insist upon it as against Royce, but I see no reason to think that it need apply to all minds. Whether the laws of logic apply to things, Prof. Boodin thinks, is a question that can only be decided by acting upon the assumption that they are true and seeing whether they are verified. I do not think that the matter can really be put in this way. If the laws be true at all they do apply to things and the whole question is: Given that we believe them are they true? And I do not see how any experience could support or refute them because if they were false we could not tell what ought to follow from any hypothesis even from the hypothesis that they are false.

In the latter part of the book the author expresses the very chastened form of Pragmatism, which he holds. It is in fact nothing but the hypothetical method. In insisting that all ontological speculation must follow this method I agree with Prof. Boodin. But the method itself rests on principles which cannot be proved by it without circularity, for which in fact there is no evidence and never can be any. Pragmatism, which the author considers to be a purely epistemological theory, has been blamed, he thinks, for metaphysical speculations which individuals have built upon it. Thus it is not to be identified with humanism or with the view that truth and usefulness coincide. Prof. Boodin's own metaphysical position is realism but not *naïf* realism. It is to be noted that on his definition of idealism the view that *esse = percipere* would be quite compatible

with realism though he himself does not think there is evidence for that axiom. His view seems to be that things really do have sensible qualities in certain contexts, *viz.* when they stand in certain relations to organised bodies with minds. In other contexts they have different qualities. It is hardly fair to criticise this view until it has been more fully stated and defended in Prof. Boodin's coming work. A difficulty that suggests itself is the following: A sees a body from straight in front and it looks circular, B sees it from an angle and it looks elliptical. A says 'the body X in the context *a* is circular' and B says 'the body X in the context *b* is elliptical'. So far there is no contradiction. But unfortunately the body is in both contexts at once and ∴ is at once circular and elliptical for it is the body and not the body-in-such-and-such-a-context to which these qualities are ascribed.

The last chapter is devoted to the reality of religious ideals. The hypothetical method is again employed, but, as it seems to me, employed wrongly. If religious belief be necessary in order to obtain the highest kind of life then the religious ideal must possess in some degree objective reality, we are told. Now this may be a valid argument if certain premises be supplied, but it is not in any case, as the author seems to think, parallel to the testing of a scientific hypothesis by experiment. For the higher life that (we will suppose) is only lived by persons who believe in God may very well not be a result of the truth of the belief *i.e.* of the actual existence of God, but of the belief as a psychical event independent of its truth or falsity.

Finally some misprints are to be noted. On page 16 should not 'evolutionary' be substituted for 'revolutionary'. On page 303 Sir J. J. Thomson has an excrescent p forced into his name.

C. D. Broad.

Maurice the Philosopher (a Dialogue); *or Happiness, Love and the Good.* By Harold P. Cooke, Lecturer in Armstrong College; with an introduction by Dr. F. C. S. Schiller. Cambridge: W. Heffer & Sons, 1912. Pp. xiii, 106.

The chief impression one gets from this book is of the extreme difficulty of the task which Mr. Cooke has set himself. The writing of dialogue in a novel or a play, whether light or serious, is a simple matter compared with that of making the reader interested in the verbal struggles of three young modern philosophers discussing the largest ethical questions, however realistically. In fact, the more realistic the scenes are made, the more one's attention is distracted from the ostensive problems themselves, and drawn towards the logical and rhetorical side of the situation. Mr. Cooke's young graduates—like real ones—are in the first place bent upon turning their phrases well and prevailing over each other, and only in the second place upon the spade-work of inquiry. The result is that what we get is chiefly an object-lesson in the subtler tricks of debate, and in the logic which underlies them. So regarded, however, the realism of the treatment is an advantage. The air of summer-weather leisure in beautiful surroundings agrees very well with the good-tempered complacency of the characters; and it helps to account for the ease with which certain large assumptions, natural to the unifying purpose of philosophy, pass unnoticed at first and yet gradually make their presence felt.

The conception of 'perfect happiness' as capable of existing at all is one of these assumptions—perfect happiness conceived as an intense and *unbroken* feeling. But does our mundane experience of happiness lead us